




Oratory, and Grief ReadingBackground
Cicero’s theory of the relationship between philosophy 
and oratory—namely, that they are mutually 
dependent on each other, was not a commonly held 
belief.  
On the one hand, Plato perpetuated the perspective 
that rhetoric was “insincere and unknowing” and that 
it was a diminished form of philosophy which led 
people astray. Thus, many philosophers were wary of 
oratory. Cicero, on the other hand, suggested that “to 
commit one’s reflections to writing, without being able 
to arrange or express them clearly…indicates a man 
who makes an unpardonable misuse of leisure and his 
pen.” In other words, oratory is necessary to do 
philosophy. 
On the other side of the controversy, philosophy was 
primarily seen as a Greek pursuit, and it was not 
considered particularly respectable for a Roman 
aristocrat to engage in it. However, Cicero had made 
clear his opinion on the subject in his work entitled On 
the Orator. As the title suggests, Cicero’s focus was 
what the ideal orator should be like. This is a 
divergence from the typical oratory rule-book. Cicero’s 
ideal orator is not a rule-follower, but a certain kind of 
person that can suit their speech to any situation. In 
order to achieve that, Cicero argued, the ideal orator 
needs universal knowledge, especially philosophy. 
Thus, oratory is reliant on philosophy. 
In the years before and after the Tusculan 
Disputations, Cicero had been writing many 
philosophical works which incorporated his counter-
cultural stand on the relationship between philosophy 
and oratory. The Disputations are unique, however, in 
that they are the first philosophical work (that is, not 
including his Consolation) written after the death of his 
daughter, and there is clear evidence that Cicero was 
still grieving at the time. Evidence of his affection for 
his daughter during her life is frequently found in 
Cicero’s personal letters, where he speaks glowingly of 
his “darling little Tullia.” Upon her death, Cicero writes 
to his friend Atticus about building her a shrine to 
“consecrate her memory by every kind of memorial 
borrowed from the genius of all the masters.” Later 
letters also suggest that Cicero was criticized for 
grieving an extended period of time, to which Cicero 
responded “for my part I don’t see what people are 
complaining of or what they expect of me. Not to 
grieve? How is that possible!”
Some figures in history loom so large they become 
multiple people in the imagination, and Marcus 
Tullius Cicero was certainly one. Cicero was a 
Roman orator, philosopher, writer, exile, father, and 
many other things.  
Unfortunately, these “sides” of Cicero are rarely 
addressed at the same time by scholars, a practice 
which, while understandable, disrupts the continuity 
of Cicero as a single human being.  
The Tusculan Disputations, written in 45 BCE, is one 
of Cicero’s philosophical works wherein the 
continuity of Cicero is especially important to a 
complete understanding. It is comprised of five 
books, each containing a preface from Cicero and a 
fictitious discussion (disputation) taking place at his 
Tusculan villa between two interlocutors denoted 
merely as “A.” and “M.” Each disputation, in order, 
addresses these issues, which build on each other: is 
death an evil? (not necessarily) is pain an evil? (not 
necessarily), is a wise man susceptible to distress 
(no) is the wise man free from all disorders of the 
soul? (yes) is virtue sufficient for a happy life? (yes).  
Scholarship surrounding this work falls into two 
general categories: most historians focus on the 
interplay between Cicero’s career in oratory and his 
passion for philosophy, but some historians focus 
entirely upon Cicero’s grief, as his daughter, Tullia, 
had died as a result of childbirth earlier in the year.  
My aim is to reconcile these two perspectives, 
viewing them together while reading because they 
are equally significant factors in any given moment 
of the Tusculan Disputations. 
The contribution of Cicero’s oratorical, 
philosophical, and personal backgrounds should 
be kept in mind while reading the entirety of the 
Disputations. Here, from Book V, is an example of 
how they can all factor into any given moment: 
Recall how the discussion of Book IV concluded 
that a wise man (who is also, by default, a virtuous 
man) is free from all disorders of the soul. One 
should then conclude that virtue is sufficient for a 
happy life. However, the character denoted “A.” did 
not do so. He says: “It does not appear to me that 
virtue can be sufficient for leading a happy life…if 
you are going to do any good, you must look out for 
some fresh arguments. Those you have given have 
no effect on me.” A’s concern is specifically whether 
circumstance has a part to play in happiness. In a 
similar passage in Book I, the interlocutor insists 
that they have read Plato, have been convinced by 
him while reading, but have accrued doubt once 
they put the book down. 
These passages leave open the possibility of an 
airtight philosophical case that which remains 
unconvincing to the human conscience. In the 
preface of Book V, Cicero himself admits to having 
such human doubts, which likely has to do with 
the difficulty of his own circumstance. Cicero, 
while he concludes that virtue is sufficient for a 
happy life, remains ever so slightly unconvinced, 
and it comes through in his work. 
However, Cicero’s grief is not the only factor. Cicero 
is, of course, engaging in philosophical discourse, 
and he is relying on oratory. Cicero has spent his 
professional career persuading others not only 
through evidence and sound logic but through 
sounding convincing.  
Thus, in the very same passage, Cicero shows 
himself to be a grieving father who needs to be 
convinced— not merely logically bested— as 
regards whether virtue is sufficient for a happy life, 
and he shows a need for both philosophy and 
rhetoric blended in order to properly address the 
issue. A complete, multi-faceted Cicero wrote this 
passage, and the same is true of the Tusculan 
Disputations as a whole.
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